QUARTERLY LETTER
Published Third Quarter 1991
Muhlenkamp
Memorandum 19
A Pause to Reappraise
The second quarter of 1991 was one of bottoming
in the economy and a generally sideways movement in the stock
and bond markets. After recovering from fears of war and recession
with a 12-15% rise in the first quarter, the stock market
held its gains in the second quarter. Bonds moved down a bit
as debt markets absorbed heavy borrowing by the U.S. Treasury
and the Federal Republic of Germany. Meanwhile, the public
had a chance to return to routine living after the emotional
trauma of the war.
Economists are now concluding that the recession
is probably over. Their focus has shifted from "How deep
is the recession?" to "What will shape the recovery?"
Some fear that any strength in GNP will result in higher inflation.
Others fear that economic recovery will be aborted by a combination
of still high inflation and modest growth in the money supply.
The economists expressing these fears were saying the same
thing in 1982, and they were wrong. At that time, modest money
growth resulted in a dramatic decline in inflation, even as
the economy recovered into 1983.
Today, the monetary circumstances are similar
to 1982-83. We see nothing that implies an increase in inflation.
In fact, we see a significant decrease as likely once again.
High real interest rates and a shift in consumer attitudes
(see below) may make the recovery less robust than that of
1983, but the longer rates remain well above inflation the
greater the likelihood they'll decline over time. Renewed
strength in our stock and bond markets is awaiting this decline,
but we don't know when it will begin.
The More Things Change, The More They Stay
The Same
One major function of recession is to dampen
consumer enthusiasm, typically after years of growth. Another
function is to make the public reevaluate and reappraise those
areas where prices have gotten most out of line with economic
reality. During the 1970s for example, farmers who sold land
for twice it's "economic" price watched their neighbors
bid it still higher. In Texas, the assumption that the price
of oil could only increase drove other prices up as well,
especially real estate.
Oil and farmland were subsequently reappraised
in the recession of 1980-82, but the rest of the country ignored
the warnings. During the 1980s, the public's perception of
ever-rising real estate prices was unshakable. Eventually
it became apparent that the economic realities of both commercial
and residential real estate had changed dramatically from
the 1970s. In 1987, we wrote an essay entitled "Wake
Up America, Houses Don't Make Money" attempting to point
out these changes. We received many responses of "Yes,
but not in Boston; or yes, but not in Washington D.C., Philadelphia,
etc." Real estate nationwide is now in the process of
being reappraised.
Among homeowners, we are seeing a shift
in attitudes and actions from "Trade up on the equity"
to "Prepay on the mortgage." Demographers have been
saying for years that when the baby boomers turned 40-something,
their focus would shift from borrowing for houses to saving
for college tuition. We suspect that the traumatic events
of 1990 have helped to accelerate this shift. We don't yet
know how large the shift may be, and we aren't likely to know
for some time, but any shift at all will have tremendous effects
on the shape of our economy for at least the next decade.
While the 30-something baby boomers have
been paying high interest rates without giving it critical
thought, their retired parents have been receiving correspondingly
high rates on their savings, and assuming it would continue
indefinitely. These retirees were taught to "protect
principal and spend income", a rule of thumb which works
well in a low inflation (0-1%) environment, but they continued
to use this rule when inflation soared to over 10% in 1980-82
and then settled at 4-5% for a number of years. Such inflation
destroyed much of the purchasing power of their principal
(see our Time Bomb essay) without their knowledge. They only
became aware of the destruction when interest rates (and thus
their "income") subsequently fell.
During the first leg down in interest rates
in the early 1980s, many bought "high yield" bond
funds or other securities which promised high incomes, only
to discover that the promises were empty. Many lost sizable
portions of their assets. We are now in the midst of a repeat
of that experience. Many retirees have come to depend on "income"
yields of 8-9%. Yet, since last winter, short-term rates have
dropped to 5-6%. Relying on their rule of thumb, many retirees
are facing a spending cutback of up to 30%. Some are simply
hoping for a return to higher rates (unlikely, in our opinion).
Others are moving money to various areas where they are promised
(often only implicitly) rates of 8-9%. Some of the things
they are buying will not fulfill that promise.
As investors, our thoughts on solutions
to this dilemma have been covered in earlier essays. Our point
in this essay is that, in addition to a reappraisal and subsequent
lower spending by baby boomers, we are also likely to see
a reappraisal and a reduction in spending by retirees as well.
Such a reappraisal would reinforce the decline in interest
rates we've been warning about.
Read our quarterly newsletter, Muhlenkamp
Memorandum, for more by Ron Muhlenkamp.
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