| Issue 79 |
Published Third Quarter |
July 2006 |
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On June 30, 2006, the Net Asset Value of the
Muhlenkamp Fund was $81.28, down $3.16 year-to-date. Click
here to see the current Net Asset Value of the Muhlenkamp Fund.
Quarterly Letter Back
by Ron Muhlenkamp
Economic trends of the past year continue. The
economy is growing nicely in the 3% - 3½% range and inflation remains
contained in the 2%+ range. If you monitor these numbers, you might think
I’m crazy because the GDP in the fourth quarter was about 1.7% (largely
due to the hurricanes) and in the first quarter was about 5.7% (largely
due to the rebound after the hurricanes). Similarly, inflation numbers
have been higher, particularly when food and energy (always volatile)
are included. So, reported numbers in GDP and inflation have been quite
volatile. Similarly, the stock and bond markets (both domestic and foreign)
have become quite volatile. Some parts of it we foresaw; some we
didn’t. (See the following essays “Looking for a Rich Harvest,” “Questions
and Responses” and the “Muhlenkamp Minute.”) Suffice it to say that part
of our job is to shield your assets when markets turn volatile on the
downside, and we haven’t done that to our standard in the recent months.
I have frequently been asked to compare the
current economy and markets to prior periods. In this vein, I believe
the following:
• The economic and investment climate is most similar to the early 1960s;
good GDP growth and contained inflation.
• The current stage of the business cycle looks most like 1994-1995
—
a soft landing or slowdown after a nice recovery from recession.
• The current psychology and market action are volatile. There is so
much money, managed both professionally and privately, which is seeking
to latch onto the latest fad or trend and then to be the first
one off (which is the hard part) that the markets will remain quite
volatile. We think this will continue.
Many think that volatility is a bad thing. We think
it is a good thing, allowing us to buy cheap or sell dear.
Because we like the climate and the seasons
and, most importantly, we think we’re finding good companies at cheap
prices (some of
which we own — and have gotten cheaper), we think it’s an opportune
time to be investing money in our companies’ stocks.
The comments made by Ron Muhlenkamp
in this article are his opinion and are not intended to be investment
advice or a forecast of future events. Copies of past
newsletters are available on our web site at www.muhlenkamp.com.
Looking
for a Rich Harvest? Plant in the Growing Season
BACK
Ron Muhlenkamp was the guest columnist for
the May 2006 edition of “Louis Rukeyser’s Wall Street.” The following
is a reprint of the article, used with permission.
Ron Muhlenkamp is president of Muhlenkamp &
Co., manager of the Muhlenkamp Fund and author of a new book, Harvesting
Profits on Wall Street: Essays in Investing.
Investors
cite many reasons for favoring a particular class of investment, but
the most common
is simply, “It has done so well.” The unspoken assumption is that it
will continue to do well. Investors aren’t alone in this line of reasoning.
The media, too, tends to focus on recent price trends to extrapolate
future performance.
In the past few years, small-cap and foreign stocks
(especially emerging markets) have performed very well, drawing the
media’s attention and the public’s money. Money flows into mutual funds
show that people are investing heavily in small caps and emerging securities;
recent flows into foreign and international funds have outpaced flows
into domestic funds.
We think extrapolating price trends into the future
is likely to lead to poor investment results. Investing in a market
sector simply because “it’s done so well” is like choosing to plant
corn in October because your neighbor’s corn has grown so well since
April.
This tendency of the media and the investing public
to extrapolate price trends is nothing new. Let’s look at a couple of
examples from the past, then address what we expect from small-cap and
foreign stocks.
Our first example is the tech-stock fad of 1998-1999.
During the upswing, people expected tech stocks to go up because they
had gone up. The media’s focus on price trends encouraged this belief.
Today, we realize the dramatic prices those stocks reached were unsustainable.
The prices were running on momentum, exceeding the value of the companies
involved. But at the time, to those in it, the fad looked like a long-term
trend. The question is: how do you distinguish between the two? We believe
it requires two things: (1) a perspective that acknowledges fads and
looks for them; (2) a value discipline to help determine whether prices
are in a range of fair value or trading outside that range due to current
psychology (either positive or negative).
Let’s look at a second example, this time in bonds.
In 1984, inflation was 4%, corporate-bond yields were at 13% and corporate
return on equity (ROE) was 13%. This meant that a corporation had to
pay 13% in interest to borrow money, but it could expect to earn only
13% in return. This left them no margin of profit on the loan, so it
made no sense for companies to borrow.
However, since inflation was at 4%, bond investors
could earn a real return of 9% (13% interest minus 4% inflation). We
found this very attractive, so we bought bonds. The response from our
clients was, “Are you crazy? We own bonds; they’re priced at 55 cents
on the dollar!” To which we replied, “Those are the bonds we want. They
are on sale.”
Our clients were focusing on the recent trend in bond
prices. They were responding to the losses they had seen on bonds they
had already bought and assumed they would lose more in the future—extrapolating
future performance from recent performance. We were looking at the current
environment and historical norms to determine what to expect from bonds
and saw a chance to buy at a cheap price. Nine years later, we sold
those 55-cent bonds at 95 cents.
Today, core inflation is 2%. Treasury-bond rates are
5% and corporate return on equity (ROE) is 14%. So it makes sense for
companies to borrow money (they can pay 5% to borrow money on which
they can earn 14% returns), but not much sense for investors to buy
bonds (netting only 3%). Even PIMCO’s Bill Gross warns that at current
interest rates, there are insufficient premiums available to justify
buying long-term, foreign or low-quality (high-yield) bonds. Yet many
investment professionals will tell you that bonds are safe, citing the
returns and the low volatility of the past 20 years.
However you measure risk—whether as loss of money,
loss of purchasing power or volatility in price—bonds are much safer
when interest rates decline (as they have for the past 20 years) than
when interest rates are stable or rising. Bonds are decidedly unsafe
when interest rates go up, as they did in the 1970s. (By the end of
the 1970s, professionals described bonds as “Certificates of Guaranteed
Confiscation.”) We do not expect a repeat of the 1970s, but neither
do we expect interest rates to continue to decline as they have for
the past 20 years. As a result, we believe that predictions about the
safety of bonds based on the data of the past 20 years are irrelevant.
Now let’s look at small-cap stocks. In 1998, when
we screened stocks for good value (ROE above average, P/E below the
ROE and revenue growth above average), those that met our criteria were
nearly all small and mid caps. At the time, many academics had concluded
that the large-cap S&P 500 Index was unbeatable; it had outperformed
most other indices (and most money managers) for the prior decade, and
academics and the media believed this trend would continue.
Today, the situation is reversed. For the past six
years, small- and mid-cap stocks have easily outperformed large-cap
stocks. The difference has been so dramatic that the April 17, 2006
cover of Business Week features the title “Blue Chip Blues” and a stack
of chips illustrating the returns of the S&P 100 stocks (the largest
of the large-cap). Over the past five years, the share price of these
stocks is up less than 1%, while the earnings of the companies are up
over 200%. But the focus of the article is on price, not value. What
if the stock prices were too high, relative to values, five years ago—and
are cheap, relative to values, today?
We recently screened a universe of 6,000 stocks for
good value; 60% of the stocks that met our criteria have a market cap
over $3 billion. Today, we’re finding more values among large caps than
in small caps. Yet we are told that we should own small and mid caps
because they have done so well. We’re being encouraged to plant corn
when, to us, it looks like October.
And what about foreign investing? Two years ago, we
found many foreign stocks selling at discounts of 10%-20% relative to
similar U.S. companies. However, since we were finding U.S. stocks at
discounts equal to or greater than this without the risks we perceived
in other countries (such as currency risk), we chose not to invest heavily
in foreign stocks. In the past two years, the performance of many foreign
stocks (particularly in “emerging countries”) has been quite good. This
has encouraged investors to invest heavily overseas, driving the prices
of foreign stocks up (relative to value). The discounts on foreign stocks,
for the most part, are gone.
“Investing in a market sector simply because
“it’s done so well” is like choosing to plant corn in October because
your neighbor’s corn has grown so well since April.”
We believe many foreign stocks now trade on momentum,
not on value. Granted, this momentum can be self-enforcing, for a while.
We don’t know how long, or how far, this momentum might go. We do know
that, in the past, momentum trends have all died. They tended to be
killed by: (1) a change in the business cycle (which is reasonably well
understood); (2) a change in the economic climate (which is not well
understood); or (3) exuberance that couldn’t be sustained and/or expectations
that can’t be met, as in the “tech” stocks.
In general, investment managers who look for
value tend to be early in their buying and selling because the public’s
focus on price momentum often drives prices well below or above economic
values. Momentum investors tend to be late in their buying and selling
because new trends are different enough from the old trends to be hard
to recognize. As investors, you get to choose which approach you are
comfortable with. But with either approach, it is critical to recognize
the difference between momentum and economic value. You can’t just extrapolate
price trends and expect a good harvest.
"Harvesting Profits on
Wall Street:
Essays in Investing" by Ron Muhlenkamp
Ron’s new book, Harvesting Profits
on Wall Street: Essays in Investing, is now available
at major retail outlets. (You may continue to order
copies directly through our website, or by calling us
and requesting an order form.)
Questions and Responses Back
At our semi-annual seminar on
April 27, 2006, Ron Muhlenkamp presented “How Much Money
Are You Willing to Lose for a Theory?” to an audience
in Pittsburgh and to others nationally via live webcast.
Afterwards, Ron Muhlenkamp and his team of investment
analysts entertained questions. Following is an abridged
edition of the “Q&R” session. For additional commentary,
please visit www.muhlenkamp.com.
About the Economy…
What will $100 per barrel
crude do to the economy and the market? And since increasing
oil costs should affect the cost of transportation for
all imports, will inflation go up everywhere?
Ron Muhlenkamp:
First of all, the cost of transport: Folks, truckers
and railways have a pass-through of fuel surcharges,
so they pass along those costs. At $100 per barrel,
things would slow down big time. Whether we’ll get there
or not, I have no idea – but my guess would be that
if we did, it wouldn’t last very long.
What we found interesting
in the last year is as gasoline went from $1.50 to $2.50
to… well, did anybody start carpooling? Have you noticed
that your neighbors are driving less? When you get out
on the interstate, have you noticed that traffic has
been cut in half? None of that! It looks like at $3.00
[per gallon] it may be starting to bite. Folks, when
prices change, until they change far enough that people
start to change their behavior as a result, not much
happens.
We don’t know what the price of oil will do. If I had
to guess, I’d say it’s not going back down to $30 per
barrel, and it’s not going to stay at $70 a barrel because
it does look like it’s biting — and the volume used
appears to be leveling off, so it’s not growing at quite
the rate it was before. Again, we don’t know what the
price of a barrel of oil is going to do, but we suspect
that it stays below $70 and that it’s not going back
to $30 or $35.
Ken
Dupre: Also, one of the things that you never
see advertised or reported in the media is that we are
twice as efficient as we used to be with the oil. The
effect of oil as it works its way through the economy
is half of what it used to be, regardless of the price.
Ron Muhlenkamp:
When we saw the price of oil run up in the 1970s, we
ended up with a decade of inflation. The interesting
thing about inflation is that the way we calculate it
is to add up prices. But that’s not what causes it.
What causes inflation is the government printing money
faster than the economy is growing. The 1970s and ‘80s
proved that.
Today, we’re not printing money
faster than the economy is growing. The M’s, (various
measures used by the Federal Reserve to compute the
money supply), are growing at about 4%-4½%. The
economy is growing at about 5%. You don’t see inflation
running out of the box. Granted, I can only see out
about a year ahead, but, basically the growth of the
money supply doesn’t work beyond that.
Six months ago, with hurricanes Katrina and Rita shutting
down about a third of our refineries and moving from
operating at about 95% of capacity to about 65%, we
warned we might have a shortage of gasoline. (Today,
we’re operating at about 80%-85% of capacity.) Well,
the oil companies managed to import tankers of gasoline,
rather than crude oil, by using refineries in the rest
of the world. More recently, we thought the effect might
be that people would have to spend a lot more on heating
oil this year. Well, we had a warmer winter. So we haven’t
yet seen what the bite will be. We know that people
will be spending more on gasoline than we had expected
a year ago. What they spend less on, we don’t know.
The surveys tell us that they’ll spend less on eating
out and on movies and clothing. We’re rather skeptical
of surveys. We want to see what happens. What will happen
is that there will be a transfer to the extent that
when you and I spend more money on gasoline, we’ll spend
less on something else. We simply don’t know yet what
that something else is. It probably includes SUVs, but
we really don’t know that just yet. The fact that the
price of oil goes up does not mean that inflation goes
up. It means that the money you spend on oil doesn’t
get spent some place else.
What are your views on
trade deficits and China?
Ken Dupre: China fixes
their currency to ours so that it is not floating. And
the big loser with China having a fixed currency is
the Chinese worker, who gets less for what he earns
because the Chinese Yuan is so cheap. How that impacts
the US is, yes, we do lose some jobs to other countries.
But, as a result, US corporations have focused more
on growth industries. We have a lot of high-tech and
a lot of value-added industries where we’ve focused
our capital and because of that, we have high value-added
jobs. Workers here in the US get paid much more than
they do in China — and since China does not float its
currency, it hurts their workers. The flip side is it
helps the American consumer. Since we let the markets
decide and we let people decide where to spend their
money, we get goods better, faster, and cheaper. So
the US consumer wins — and as long as China wants to
keep buying US bonds — our businesses and consumers
get loans cheaper. In sum, for China to fix their currency
to the US dollar, it ultimately hurts China and helps
us more.
Ron Muhlenkamp:
Remember in the 1970s when we
worried about the trade deficit with Japan? What happened?
For a while, the Japanese bought our Treasury bonds
because they trusted the US Treasury market more than
they trusted Japanese banks. The same applies today:
the Chinese trust the US Treasury market more than they
trust Chinese banks. Back in the ‘70s, the Japanese
got very prosperous and bought things like Rockefeller
Center and Pebble Beach. I saw the prospectus on Rockefeller
Center — and the Japanese paid three times what it was
worth! The media complained about that, but the Rockefeller’s
didn’t complain. And I suspect that one of these days,
the Chinese will start buying overpriced stuff in the
United States.
What really happened in
Japan was once the next generation came along, they
were not as willing to work quite as hard as their parents
had, and things leveled off. My best guess for what
is going to happen with China is a repeat of what happened
in the 1970s with Japan. Incidentally, in the ‘70s,
the Dean of Engineering of MIT came to Pittsburgh and
said, “We’ve got a problem. The US, in terms of technical
papers, publishes more than any other country in the
world; Japan is second.” He continued to say, “The Japanese
translate all of our papers into their language, but
we don’t bother to translate theirs into our language.”
And, if you remember the ‘70s, that’s what was going
on. Well, China is doing amazing things as an economy,
but nobody’s taking for granted that we have nothing
to learn from the Chinese, as we did about the Japanese
thirty years ago. To me, the overall argument is a repeat
of the past. And it’s worked out rather well.
About our Investment Strategy…
Can you tell us if you’re investing internationally
and why
Tammy Neff: We look for good
companies at value prices, and wherever the company
is headquartered doesn’t really matter; location is
not a constraint for us. That said, when investing internationally,
you have to consider some additional risk factors like
currency risk, accounting differences, and geopolitical
concerns.
Right now, we think a
lot of attention is being paid to international [equities]
because they have done so well. It’s a momentum play.
And you can certainly make money with momentum, if you
are good at predicting the future. We think we do a
better job at identifying values.
Ron Muhlenkamp: We have
no objection to investing in foreign companies — we
just want to get paid for it. We don’t currently see
the values there; we’re not finding enough to be heavily
invested.
Please discuss your perspective
on technology companies.
Jack Kunkle:
About five years ago I’d go to
parties and “high-five” people because I’m a tech nerd.
Now, I’m lonely at parties. I believe there is a sea
change taking place in the technology industry, something
we have not seen for over 20 years. In fact, Bill Gates
seems to see the same thing in the sense that a few
months ago he spoke to his engineers and said there
is a major change going on in technology and that we
must seize the change today. It is not something in
the near future. It is today — and Microsoft’s survival
is dependent on how we make this transition.
I believe firmly that
“technology” should no longer be considered personal
computers and chips and software. It’s about services
on the Internet and in the family room and how we, as
consumers, deal with these types of services. So I am
watching, and I have to make sure that the companies
that I choose grow their earnings, as Ron suggested.
Please address the pros and
cons of investing in large-cap versus small-cap companies.
Brian Jacobs:
What we have seen for the past
five years has been dramatic out-performance by small-cap
companies in terms of price appreciation. We believe
the reasons behind that are a lot of investors adhere
to a “momentum” style, or they are “indexers.” Momentum
players chase performance; they see the out-performance
of the small-cap stocks over the past five years, and
they choose to continue throwing money at them. Indexers
manage to an index: that is, when a certain stock in
an index starts to move up, they buy more of it to keep
up with the index to minimize their “tracking error.”
And it creates a cycle. How long it continues is anybody’s
guess.
What we do know is that
we’re finding values in larger companies. Five years
ago, if you had asked us would it be probable to have
GE, Cisco, Pfizer and Merck, or Microsoft all looking
attractive to us, we would have told you, “probably
not.” Even though the stocks have done very well, their
multiples have compressed. As a result, their price-to-earnings
(P/E) ratios have come down. So, presently, we are finding
more attractive names in the larger space than in the
smaller space.
Are the investments
of 15 years ago good investments today? For example,
GM, Xerox, IBM, Steel, Reynolds, soap companies, etc.
Ron Muhlenkamp:
Number one, you can’t lump them.
You have to look at them individually.
Folks, GM is owned by
its employees past and present. What happens at GM and
Ford is up to the UAW (United Auto Workers), not up
to the board of directors of GM and Ford. So if you
want to bet your pick on the intelligence of the UAW…
Roughly 15 years ago I was at a luncheon, sitting next
to the president of the United Steel Workers and he
was very proud of the fact that they had just signed
a contract with National Steel, basically saying that
National Steel couldn’t lay off anybody. In response,
I asked “Who did National Steel get to guarantee to
buy their steel?” He looked at me kind of funny and
I said, “If nobody buys their steel, your contract is
worthless.” That hadn’t occurred to him. That is what
is going on at Ford and GM and with the UAW today.
We look at the “blue
chips” if the return on equity (ROE) is over 14% and
if the price-to-earnings ratio (PE) is below the ROE,
and if the earnings are growing. IBM? Yes. Xerox? No,
I don’t find it interesting. It’s item by item, company
by company.
Folks, the media love
to think in broad concepts. Usually, after the fact,
they can identify a broad concept that encompasses what
has worked. We don’t think that’s useful going forward.
We think it’s useful to buy good companies at cheap
prices. And if a number of them end up being in a “concept”
later, well that’s about the time we are ready to sell
them. Bottom line: we look at individual companies.
You have reviewed
criteria and analytics for stock picking, but what about
evaluating the company’s management? Does this go into
your evaluation?
Ron Muhlenkamp:
We ask these questions: Do we trust these people with
our money? Do we trust their intelligence? Do we trust
their judgment? Do we trust their integrity? If you
don’t trust their integrity, then intelligence is a
negative. I know I’m not capable of beating a smart
crook; I’m capable of beating a dumb crook. So if you
don’t trust their integrity, you walk because there
are more companies out there. In the final analysis,
we evaluate management teams using the same criteria
you use for evaluating us.
The reason we never owned
Enron is that we could never get the numbers to stack
up. We saw what they were reporting and we couldn’t
understand why the numbers were what they were. So we
didn’t own Enron. When Tyco was at $60 [per share],
it looked to us as if it was worth $30. And then we
found out that Kozlowski was spending $800 million a
year on all kinds of nonsense stuff. When it looked
like he was going out the door, the stock fell to $20
and we felt that it was worth $30 — so we started buying
it. It dropped to $10 based on the momentum, before
returning to $30. We made good money in Tyco.
Tyco bought good companies
and the top management didn’t mess around and screw
up the companies they bought. We liked the underlying
companies and we trusted the products and the markets
they were in, and we felt that they could make money.
So once rid of the problem, [Kozlowski], you could buy
Tyco quite cheap. Our average cost was something like
$17. We wish we had waited and bought it at $10.
Folks, people who look
for value tend to be early. We have a discipline that
allows us to put a reasonable value on a company. When
it is selling 30%-40% below that, we get excited. But,
sometimes, the current reputation can drive it much
below that. So value folks tend to be early, both on
the buying and on the selling. Momentum people tend
to be late. By the time a trend is identified and it’s
in all the newspapers, the momentum is well on its way.
Folks, I learned in high school that I’m not good at
fashions or trends.
You, as investors, get
to take your pick: value or momentum. In either case,
you have to have enough confidence, and the investment
manager has to have enough confidence. You have to believe
in something other than public opinion, or that you
can be a half-step ahead of public opinion. What’s popular
in the media is the trend-following stuff. They want
to plan corn in October because it’s grown so well.
If you were good at fads in high school or if you can
identify people who are good at that, you can make an
awful lot of money. If you are not good at that, you
can lose an awful lot of money.
If a company misses
an earnings estimate, up or down, it has a big effect.
This seems unfortunate. What, if anything, can be done
about it?
Ron Muhlenkamp:
If the company is doing what we expect it to do and
what is reasonable for it to do, then it is a chance
for us to buy it cheap. If it’s a surprise to us, and
we think that there are things going on that we don’t
quite trust, then it gets sold. If the company is generally
doing what we expect it to do, we’re pretty patient
investors. If the company disappoints, then the stock
gets sold pretty quickly.
What’s always interesting, of course, is when the company
does well and the stock does poorly. Then you review
all your information and try to be sure that you still
believe the numbers. If the numbers hold up, then the
only problem is the ‘stomach problem.’ Folks, I can
teach you the brain part of this stuff. It’s just that
every now and then the market tests your stomach. We
get paid more for our stomach than we get paid for our
head.
How do you decide to
sell a stock?
Ron Muhlenkamp: If it
becomes overpriced, or the company isn’t doing what
we think it should do, it gets sold. If it gets to be
fairly priced and we think it’s running on momentum,
then we’ll sell it down to a normal position.
What’s interesting is when the company is doing well
and the stock isn’t. The trouble with writing the rules
is that you feel free, sometimes, to break them. With
the stocks that aren’t doing well, the rule is that
it should be sold. On occasion, I break that rule. Breaking
the rule works about 60% of the time; the other 40%
gets pretty painful.
About the Fund…
It seems lately that the Net Asset Value (NAV) has fluctuated
more widely than the overall market. What brings this
about? Also, what action will the Fund take if NAV reaches
or exceeds $100 per share?
Ron Muhlenkamp: Allow
me to answer the second question first. If it gets to
the point where you send in an extra penny that gets
lost in a rounding error for the number of shares purchased,
we might have to do a stock split on the NAV. For example,
if you send in $100 versus $100.01, the latter gets
priced out to the fourth decimal place in shares and
then rounded back down to the third. So, if it gets
to the point when a penny does not buy an extra fraction
of a share, we’ll deal with it.
With regard to the volatility of the NAV, there is so
much quick money out there among individual investors
and hedge fund managers alike that, on a day-to-day
basis, prices are very volatile. And we happen to hold
things like energy, which is ultra volatile. We hold
housing which has been back and forth. Yesterday, good
numbers were reported for housing and the stocks jumped.
Today, a couple of housing companies reported their
sales for the quarter were down. Overall, it looks like
February was down and things came back a little bit
in March. I call this a digestive process. Some people
may think of it as indigestion, but, think about it:
digestion is a pretty messy process.
We saw “digestion” play out last year. At the end of
September ’05, the Fund was up 7%; at the end of October,
it was up 0%; and in December, it was up 7.9%. All the
things that had run up nicely, and in our case that
was energy and home building, gave it back in October.
It has a lot to do with the momentum players who, when
things turn negative, sell in a flash. We think it’s
crazy, but it’s going on. There is so much money chasing
“momentum” that we expect the volatility to continue.
And that can either be a good thing or a bad thing.
Anybody here go to auctions? Why do you go to an auction?
To get a bargain? Do you think that all prices at an
auction are a bargain? If you’re the only bidder, you
might get a bargain. If there are two or three bidders,
can auction prices go crazy? Folks, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) is an auction market. The key to getting
a bargain at an auction is knowing exactly what you
want and what you are willing to pay for it. When we
buy stocks, we want return on equity (ROE) above average
with a price-to-earnings ratio (PE) below that, and
we want growth above average. And if we don’t get a
bargain price, we won’t chase it.
Another reason some people go to an auction is for the
entertainment. Do you think the stock market is entertaining?
They certainly think so on CNBC — and they are in the
entertainment business! Folks, the real reason to go
to an auction is for the volatility. If you know what
you want and what you are willing to pay for it, then
volatility is a great thing. It gives you the chance
to buy it cheap, but it only works when nobody else
wants it. You and I cannot buy a Buick at a Chevy price
if everybody loves Buicks. Similarly, the only way you
are going to get a good company cheap, is if people
don’t like it. That’s the business that we’re in. We
try to find values and determine what we’re willing
to pay. We go to the auction. If we can get our product
at our price, then we buy it. And if we can’t, we won’t.
Thirty years ago Connie was an Avon Lady. Remember when
word got out that a couple of Avon gals had a stash
of bottles up in the attic and they sold them for, I
don’t know, $25,000 as collectors items? Connie had
two gals on her route who bought one of everything.
How many Avon ladies are in the country? If each one
had just one customer who buys one of everything, what’s
going to be rare? The only way you get ‘rare’ is when
it’s junk. When a lot of people collect one of everything,
it’s not rare anymore. When it becomes popular, it’s
over — and that’s also true in the business we’re in.
We refer to it by saying “Everyone wants to plant corn
in October because it’s grown so well since April.”
People want to extrapolate the gain as if nothing has
changed. We think the time to plant corn is April, after
it hasn’t grown for six months.
The comments made by Ron Muhlenkamp
and his Investment Team are opinion and are not intended
to be investment advice or a forecast of future events.
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is a price-weighted
average of 30 significant stocks traded on the New York
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. The DJIA was invented by
Charles Dow back in 1896.
NASDAQ is a market-capitalization weighted index of
more than 3,000 common equities.
Muhlenkamp
Minute Back
Recent Trends in the International, Commodities, Bond
and Stock Markets
Recorded June 1, 2006 – Ron Muhlenkamp, Portfolio Manager
Several trends have been in evidence over the last six
to nine months, some of these trends
going back several years. Most of these trends have
several things in common. They started from a “value”
base, their prices rose to value levels but they kept
climbing based on momentum. In our view, the public
has insisted on playing each of these trends until it
lost money.
In particular:
After 20 years of declining interest rates, long-term
bonds were viewed as safe – until interest rates rose
earlier this year resulting in losses on bonds.
Secondly, after three years of “out-performance,” emerging
markets attracted a lot of money, then Bolivia nationalized
oil and gas reserves and Ecuador seized the assets of
Occidental Petroleum. Many emerging market securities
have tanked in the last month with some markets down
30% - 40%.
Thirdly, commodities, especially metals, have been quite
high. We’ve been hearing that financial buyers (think
speculators and hedge funds) have bought more metals
contracts in the last few months than have the users
of these metals (think auto companies and Caterpillar).
Metal prices, including gold prices, have cracked in
the last few weeks.
Fourthly, small-cap stocks, which were great values
several years ago, became fully priced in our view.
The fact that many dedicated small and mid-cap funds
have been closed to new money indicates their managers
had the same view. The prices of some of these stocks
have cracked in the last month, to the extent that the
NASDAQ is down year-to-date, although the DJIA is up.
In our case, we didn’t trust the prices of bonds, commodities
and emerging markets. We’ve been moving money toward
some stocks that are larger in capitalization. Until
now, that move has been early. We’re about to find out
whether it’s been right!
In the meantime, we’ve been hurt by holdings in housing
stocks. We continue to hold on to these stocks because
we see great value there.
But the stocks have gone from 7-8 times earnings to
5-6 times earnings and this has hurt our performance.
We think each
of the above trends is now turning.
This is Ron Muhlenkamp with the Muhlenkamp “two” Minutes.
| Location |
Date |
|

Muhlenkamp & Company Investment
Seminar
Marriott Courtyard Denver
Tony Muhlenkamp will deliver The Basics of Investing.
The doors will open at 6:00 p.m. and the seminar will begin at
7:00 p.m. Light refreshments will be served. The Marriott Courtyard
Denver Downtown is located at 934 16th Street near the 16th Street
Mall.
To attend this event free of charge, please call our Client Service
Department at (877)935-5520 x4 to register.
|
August
16 |
|
FPA
Midwest Continuing Education Symposium
Conference Center at North Pointe, Lewis Center, OH.
Please stop by our exhibit booth. |
October
10 |
|

San Francisco Marriott
Tony Muhlenkamp will deliver a workshop: Back to Basics
- How to Make Money in the Current Investment Climate.
Ken Dupre, one of our equity analysts, will be conducting a
workshop on Optimizing Investment Performance - Helping
Investors Become Better Investors.
To register for free admission, call (800) 970-4355 or visit
the MoneyShow
website and reference code #005073. If you’d like
to talk with us while at the Show, please stop by our exhibit
booth (#408) or call (877) 935-5520 to arrange a visit.
|
October
16-18 |
|
| 
In addition to publishing our quarterly newsletter, Muhlenkamp
Memorandum, we find it useful to provide periodic updates on topical
issues. To this end, we use the Muhlenkamp Minute to record an
off-cycle message whenever it seems appropriate.
The Muhlenkamp Minute is available on our website at www.muhlenkamp.com,
and by calling our toll-free telephone number at 1-877.935.5520
ext 5.
The most recent message, recorded by Ron Muhlenkamp
on June 1, 2006, is included in this issue of the Muhlenkamp Memorandum.
|
|
Webcast Archive: Now Available
A webcast archive of Ron Muhlenkamp’s presentation How Much Money
Are You Willing to Lose for a Theory? is now available. Please visit
www.muhlenkamp.com and click on the designated link for viewing.
|
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