Quarterly
Letter
We believe that, long term, stock and bond prices reflect economic values. But for shorter periods of time, prices are set by market supply and demand, much like any other auction. Our puzzle the past six months has been seeing great companies selling at cheap prices, and then watching them continue to get cheaper. In trying to determine why, we’ve taken a look at a number of factors, including the sizeable amounts of forced selling that took place in 2008 and extended into 2009. We’re also looking at factors that signal a change. Hedge Funds: Their Impact on the Markets We believe that deleveraging by hedge funds1 and redemptions at both hedge funds and open-end mutual funds were at the center of the forced selling. The difficulty is getting good numbers on hedge funds, but the following is the best that we’ve been able to put together: • At the end of ’07, there appears to have been about $1.7 trillion or $1.8 trillion invested in hedge funds. The extent to which they were leveraged — particularly in stock funds — we don’t know. • During ’08, hedge funds were told to deleverage, primarily by their primary dealers or investment bankers. It looks like they had to cut their leverage in half; for instance, from four-to-one to two-to-one. • During ’08, there were redemptions of approximately $400 billion out of hedge funds. This was concentrated in the latter part of the year, particularly in October and November. Redemptions continued into January and February of ’09 to the tune of about a $120 billion. What do these numbers mean? Hedge funds deleveraged by about half in ’08. (Mandates went out fairly early in ’08, so we believe the deleveraging is probably over.) Many hedge funds have the requirement that to withdraw funds, the investor must provide ninety days notice. We think hedge funds got those messages in September (to take effect in December) and did a lot of selling in October. In October, almost everything went down in price: bonds, stocks — foreign and domestic — and real estate, (as represented by Barclays Capital Aggregate Index, MSCI EAFE Index, S&P 500 Index, and S&P/Case Shiller Home Price Index, respectively)2. We think of this period as an “estate sale” at which assets will be sold regardless of price, due to the forced selling. We believe there was a second round of forced selling as pension fund trustees read their financial reports after year-end ’08. These statements brought home how much the prices of their assets were bid down during October and November. Upon receiving these reports in January and February of ’09, we suspect some of them said, “Just get me out.” Whatever the reason, it looks like there was an additional $120 billion in redemptions in January and February of ’09. Worth noting, some hedge funds postponed the date at which investors could redeem. As those postponements are coming to a close, we are hearing that as of year-end, hedge funds are sitting on a fair amount of cash. Some firms monitor hedge funds, and it looks like they went from a fully invested position in late ’07 to a sizeable cash position in late ’08. Bottom line: Our judgment is that the deleveraging is over and that most of the forced selling is over. Forced Selling compounded by Mark-to-Market Accounting While forced selling was taking place, there was no forced buying. There may have been as much as $1 trillion of forced selling in ’08, but there was not enough buying to offset it. For those who did buy in ‘08, further price declines made it painful, so buying was quickly discouraged. Further, any buying by banks and insurance companies was discouraged by “mark-to-market” accounting, FASB #157.3 We describe mark-to-market accounting in our booklet, Bailouts, Your Dollars, & the Whole Credit Mess, which is available on our website. Following is an example of its impact: If you’re an insurance company, most of your assets are bonds and mortgages. Buying new bonds and mortgages in ’08 was problematic because if the bid price dropped at all, mark-to-market accounting lowered your asset base. Specifically, it lowered your regulatory capital, thereby limiting the amount of business you could do. As of mid-March ’09, mark-to-market accounting is being neutralized. FASB hasn’t suspended it, nor rescinded it, but it has clarified the regulation in ways that look like the continued markdowns of mark-to-market accounting may be over. A Turn of Events: From Forced Selling to Forced Buying We find it interesting that, as of mid-March ’09, we’re seeing forced buying. The various programs coming out of the federal government are beginning to spend money by buying mortgage-backed securities and Treasury bonds. We believe that the forced selling of 2008 cut across all asset classes. When you are getting redemptions, you have to sell something. (You would like to sell what you want to; but if you can’t, you have to sell something.) In contrast, the forced buying is in a somewhat limited range, primarily in debt-type securities. Both TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) and TALF are buying primarily debt-type securities. This, in conjunction with an alleviation of mark-to-market accounting, enables the bolstering of balance sheets amongst banks and insurance companies. Presumably, the impact will be reflected in their common stocks, which leads to the bounce we had since early March. While much of the bounce was ascribed to Treasury Secretary Geithner’s new plans, including PPIP (Private-Public Partnership Investment Program), I think the change in mark-to-market accounting was more important to that bounce than Geithner’s plan. In summary, I think that the combination of forced selling ending, and forced buying beginning, along with the alleviation of mark-to-market accounting changed the game in terms of short-term supply and demand. As a result, we’re putting our cash to work. The comments made by Ron Muhlenkamp in this article are his opinion and are not intended to be investment advice or a forecast of future events. Copies of past newsletters are available at www.muhlenkamp.com. 1 Hedge fund is an investment fund open to a limited range of investors that is permitted by regulators to undertake a wider range of investment and trading activities than other investment funds and pays a performance fee to its investment manager. 2 Barclays Capital Aggregate Index represents the universe of U.S. investment-grade bonds. MSCI EAFE Index represents foreign stocks. It is maintained by Morgan Stanley Capital International/Barra; the EAFE acronym stands for Europe, Australasia, and Far East.
S&P/Case Shiller Home Price Index represents quarterly nominal house prices for the United States. 3 Mark-to-market, FASB #157, is an accounting method of assigning a value to a financial instrument based on the current market price for the instrument or similar instruments.
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